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*Reports 8
NIAM*

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MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for USSR/EE


SUBJECT: A Devil's Advocate View of Soviet Detente Policy

REFERENCE: Draft NIAM 11-9-74, Soviet Detente Policy,
24 April 1974

1. I wish to question the community's judgment, reflected in the NIAM, that there is "a strong consensus" among Soviet leaders behind the "general concept of detente." (Para. 8) I agree that most--but probably not all--Soviet leaders, and most--but far from all--Soviet spokesmen below the leadership level, share the view that detente "in no way lessens the ceaseless rivalry with the outside world especially its highly industrialized countries", nor ushers in "an era of East-West cooperation, devoid of conflicts". (Paras. 1-2) But in recent months some influential Soviets have tried to extend the concept of detente beyond just "a relaxation of the stringencies of the Soviet regime" domestically. (Para. 5) Moreover, these Soviets are not merely dissidents, scientist-technicians, or industrial executives (para. 5), but people who occupy important Party and government positions. If this devil's advocate view is accepted, then it seems to follow that there is, or soon will be, serious struggle within the leadership over detente, and at least some doubt that the leadership can survive the struggle in its present composition.

2. I have in mind, first of all, Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Nikolay Smelyakov, one time president of Amtorg, the Soviet trade agency in the United States. Shortly after he returned from a visit to the U.S. last June, he composed an article on Soviet foreign economic policy published in December by the still relatively liberal journal Novy Mir. It is the political flavor of this ostensibly economic article which is so striking, e.g.:

--"Foreign trade serves not only economic objectives measured in cash terms; it is a cementing element for drawing together individuals, peoples, and states, including those with different social structures. It creates a favorable climate for settling political questions."



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--"Competitiveness in a certain sense reflects not only the industrial sophistication but also the general cultural level of the producing nation, its economy, science, social structure and even history."

--"The export of machinery and equipment is good medicine against bragging and arrogance."

--"Much can be seen from the windows of foreign trade...the activities of states and nations, their industry, agriculture, economy, way of life and many other things foreign trade organization personnel can observe."

--"Visiting other countries, thus becoming a special kind of traveler, I have always borne in mind the admonition of the great English scientist Isaac Newton...that it is the business of the traveler to learn, not to teach, that he should study the politics, commerce and affairs of state of nations... should study the laws and customs if they differ from ours,... [and] the activities of those persons who are the most remarkable in each country as regards intellect, learning and esteem."

Smelyakov's message to Soviet readers appears the opposite of the warnings by other Soviet spokesmen on the dangers of ideological penetration from abroad in an era of emerging detente.

25X1 3. This brings me to a second example, the case of Ivan Frolov. One of these leading Soviet spokesmen who have been warning against the ideological dangers of detente is Sergey Trapeznikov, head of the CPSU Central Committee section for science and higher educational institutions. One of his principal targets during the past year has been the journal Questions of Philosophy, edited by Frolov. In January 1974 Frolov hit back in an editorial in his journal. The analysts who follow such matters down at [] term this editorial "the most outspoken critique of the system of political controls in the social sciences to appear in a Soviet publication in the post war period".

4. Specifically, Frolov acknowledged that his journal had been attacked, but he in turn attacked those who, under the guise of "ultra party loyalty", mask their "lack of talent and professional ability" by conducting "cavalry raids" against innovative social scientists. The editorial cited Brezhnev's August 1973 speech at Alma Ata expressing confidence in the ability of the Soviet system to meet the test of detente, but then obviously went beyond Brezhnev by stressing "the need to seek out and the ability to find the truth, no matter how bitter and mercilessly critical it is." Frolov called for "a profound and objective analysis of

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the real processes of social life" and urged scholars to probe more deeply into "actual questions of the development of society and contemporary scientific knowledge." What Frolov was saying in other words, is that the Soviets need to reexamine their social order and political structure. This was the type of question which began to be publicly asked in Czechoslovakia several months before Novotny was replaced by Alexander Dubcek in Czechoslovakia.

5. The third case in point concerns the decline and rise of A. G. Yegorov, former editor of the principal Party journal Kommunist. Yegorov wrote an article in the November 1973 issue of the literary journal Znamya in which he argued that detente and the scientific-technical revolution increase the need for exchange of "artistic valuables" with the West--not just goods or technology, but "artistic valuables." Moreover, he spoke of art as valuable for all mankind rather than as "class" art. He also took unusually moderate positions on other intellectual issues.

6. Not surprisingly in January 1974, Yegorov lost his job as chief editor of Kommunist. What is surprising is that within three months he had become director of one of the USSR's top ideological institutions, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism. In his new post he has overall responsibility, under the provisions of a 1967 Central Committee decree on the social sciences, for work in Party history--a field of study serving mainly to rationalize and authenticate current Soviet policies. He replaces a man in many ways his ideological opposite, P. N. Fedoseyev. Meanwhile, the top post at Kommunist remains vacant, and the journal itself, according to those who follow it, has become a forum for sharply divergent ideological viewpoints.

7. These three revisionists have many opponents. Trapeznikov and Fedoseyev have been mentioned; others in this category include for example the head of the Institute for Military History, General Pavel Zhilin, and a philosopher who prefers to express his views in Red Star, M. B. Mitin. But the revisionists have allies too, who are expressing themselves a little more cautiously in public, but perhaps even more boldly in private. In my judgment, the issues (and the positions) involved are of such transcendent importance that the disputes must be reverberating at the leadership level. I cannot attempt to identify specific leaders with one or the other side. But the fact that both sides are quoting Brezhnev in public (though both may be attacking Brezhnev in private) indicates that the issues are unresolved.

8. The analysts who compile the [] suggest that all this shows there is an "absence of a stable consensus in the top Soviet leadership" on the ideological implications of detente. As devil's advocate, I argue further that the whole concept of detente is in dispute, and, that consequently the cohesion of the leadership itself is disintegrating. Beyond this I would estimate that the dispute is almost extraneous to the

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specific subjects of negotiation between the USSR and the West. Perhaps if the process of East-West negotiation were halted entirely there would be a serious impact on the internal debate, but only then. The conflict, it seems to me, has acquired its own momentum, is being fought with its own weapons, and is moving gradually, but not too slowly, toward its own dramatic conclusion.

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